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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS:
CONTRACT READING REVISITED
THEODORE

J. ST. ANTOINE*

Introduction
A quarter century ago, in a presentation at the Academy's annual
meeting, I used the phrase "contract reader" to characterize the
role an arbitrator plays in construing a collective bargaining
agreement. 1 That two-word phrase may be the only thing I ever said
before this body which has been remembered. Unfortunately, it is
almost invariably misunderstood. Time and again members have
reproached me: "What's the big deal about contract reading,
anyway? Isn'titjust the same as contract interpretation?" Or, more
substantively scathing: "Do you really think, Ted, that all you have
to do to interpret a labor agreement is to read it?!"
Those two masters of contract interpretation, Arthur Corbin2
and Carlton Snow, 3 know that context is nearly everything in
extracting meaning from a set of words. When I spoke of the
"contract reader" years ago, it was in the con text of a paper dealing
with judicial review of an arbitrator's award. The process of contract interpretation as such was not my concern. I had a simplebut I like to think important-point to make. When a court has
before it an arbitrator's award applying a collective bargaining
agreement, it is just as if the employer and the union had signed a

*President, 1999-2000, National Academy of Arbitrators;James E. & Sarah A. Degan
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
1
St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and
Its Progeny, in Arbitration-1977, Proceedings of the 30th Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators, eds. Dennis & Somers (BNA Books 1978), 29, 30-36.
2
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the ParolEvidence Rul.e, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 17172 (1965).
'Snow, Contract Interpretation, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 681, 688-92 (1987).
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stipulation stating: "What the arbitrator says this contract means is
exactly what we meant it to say. That is what we intended by
agreeing that the award would be 'final and binding.' " In this
sense, an "erroneous interpretation" of the contract by the arbitrator is a contradiction in terms.
Now, my law school colleague Yale Kamisar, who has had more
of his articles cited by the U.S. Supreme Court than any other
contemporary scholar, advises us legal scribblers that it is not
enough to have a sound idea. "To make a lasting impression," says
Yale, "you must couch your ideas in memorable language." 4 So,
way back in 1977, I tried my best to come up with a catchy phrase
to convey my notion about the relationship between arbitrators
and the contracts they are asked to interpret. What could be more
apt than to get a court to think of the arbitrator as simply picking
up the parties' agreement and "reading it off' as easily and
straightforwardly as A-B-C?Yale didn't tell us, however, that sometimes you can succeed too well. The audience may remember your
catchy phrase-and entirely forget your point!
Today I am going to take two quite different tacks. First, I shall
update the thesis that I thought I was communicating to you nearly
25 years ago. The emphasis will be on what may be the hottest issue
in judicial review: When may a court set aside an arbitral award on
the grounds it violates public policy? Second, in response to your
overwhelming demand, I'd like to talk a little about what many of
you thought I was trying to say all along: How should an arbitrator
go about "reading," or interpreting, a contract?
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards

The story begins, of course, with David Feller's great triumph in
the Steelworkers Trilogy. 5 There the Supreme Court made arbitration
the linchpin in the federal scheme for the implementation of
collective bargaining agreements. More specifically, for our purposes, the Court in one of the three cases, Enterprise Wheel, 6 imposed
tight constraints onjudicial review of arbitral awards. So long as the
award is not the product of fraud or corruption, does not exceed
the arbitrator's authority under the parties' submission, and "draws
4

1n a personal conversation with the author, circa 1970.

'Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 LRRM 2414 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 46 LRRM 2416 (1960); Steelworkersv. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 46 LRRM 2423 (1960).
6 Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 46 LRRM 2423 (1960).
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its essence" from the labor contract, a court is to enforce the award
without any attempt to "review the merits."7 Despite these strictures, the itch of the judiciary to right seeming wrongs has compelled the Court to revisit the subject, most notably in Paperworkers
v. Misco. 8
Misco presented the public policy question in dramatic fashion.
The Fifth Circuit had refused to enforce an arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee whose job was to operate a dangerous papercutting machine, and whose car had been found to contain
marijuana while in the company parking lot. The Supreme Court
reversed, declaring that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision."9 The Court naturally
recognized the general common law doctrine that no contract in
contravention of law or public policy will be enforced. But it
cautioned that "a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of [labor] contracts is limited to situations where the contract
as interpreted would violate 'some explicit public policy' that is
'well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference
to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.' "10
Many lower courts have still not got the message. Judges have
been so offended by the reinstatement of deviant postal workers,
sexual harassers, and alcoholic airline pilots that they have disregarded the directives of Enterprise and Mis co. 11 Unfortunately and
unaccountably, the Supreme Court has not seen fit to step in and
insist that its dictates be followed. 12 Thus, the First13 and Fifth 14
7
Id. at 596-99, 46 LRRM at 2425-26. But the arbitrator must not "dispense his own brand
of industrial justice." Id. at 597, 46 LRRM at 2425.
8
484 U.S. 29, 126 LRRM 3113 (1987).
9
/d. at 38, 126 LRRM at 3117.
'"Id. at 43, 126 LRRM at 3119 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757,
766, 113 LRRM 2641, 31 FEP Cases 1409 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
nsee infra notes 13-14 and 21-24 and cases cited.
12
Dave Feller, who successfully argued in the Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 5, has ruefully
suggested that less deference may now be paid the awards in labor arbitration than in
commercial arbitration. Feller, Presidential Address: Bye-Bye Trilogy, Hello Arbitration!, in
Arbitration 1993: Arbitration and the Changing World of Work, Proceedings of the 46th
Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Gruenberg (BNA Books 1994), 1,
9-13.
13
US. Postal Serv. v. Postal Workers, 736 F.2d 822, 116 LRRM 2870 (1st Cir. 1984) (postal
worker embezzled $4,325 worth of money orders); Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Workers, 118 F.3d
841, 155 LRRM 2782 (1st Cir. 1997) ( driver of petroleum truck tested positive for cocaine).
14
Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Dist. 2, 889 F.2d 599, 133 LRRM 2077 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 135 LRRM 264 (1990) (grossly careless riverboat captain

4
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Circuits have taken it upon themselves to find an award at odds with
their notions of public policy, even though the action ordered,
such as a reinstatement, would not have violated any positive law or
established public policy if it had been taken by the employer on
its own initiative. The Fourth, 15 Sixth, 16 Seventh, 17 Ninth, 18 Tenth, 19
and D.C. 2° Circuits have been far more faithful to the Misco
mandate. They have enforced awards reinstating grievants which,
in effect, did not sustain or order conduct that would have been
forbidden to the employer acting unilaterally. The Second,21

nearly collided with barges); Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers, 77 F.3d 850,
151 LRRM 2737 (5th Cir. 1996) (chemical plant supervisor tested positive for drugs). But
cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 175 F.3d 355, 161 LRRM 2~65
(5th Cir. 1999) (enforcing award of public labor board reinstating railroad employee testmg
positive for drugs); Food & Commercial Workers Local540v. Pilgrim 'sPride Corp., 193 F.3d 328,
162 LRRM 2513 (5th Cir. 1999) (award upheld requiring check-off of union dues of
rehired employee without new check-off authorization).
15
Westvaco Corp. v. Paperworkers, 171 F.3d 971, 160 LRRM 2844, 79 FEP Cases 595 (4th Cir.
1999) (worker admittedly sexually harassed co-employee).
16
MonroeAutoEquip. Co. v. Auto Workers, 981 F.2d 261,142 LRRM 2150 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 931, 143 LRRM 2304 (1993) (installer of automobile test equipment
violated company drug policy); MidMichigan Reg'l Med. Ctr.-Clare v. Professional Employees,
183 F.3d 497, 161 LRRM 2853 (6th Cir. 1999) (nurse negligently handled equipment
during cardiac emergency); TVA v. Tennessee Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510,
161 LRRM 2844, (6th Cir. 1999) (nuclear reactor unit operator used marijuana).
17
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Indus. Workers (AIW), 959 F.2d 685, 139 LRRM 2865, 58 FEP Cases
692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908, 141 LRRM 2408, 59 FEP Cases 1536 (1992) (male
forklift operator sexually harassed female co-worker by grabbing her breasts).
18
Stead Motors v. Machinists Lodge 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 132 LRRM 2689 (9th Cir. 1989)
(en bane), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946, 134 LRRM 2312 (1990) (auto mechanic repeatedly
failed to tighten lug nuts on car wheels); Food & Commercial Workers Local 588 v. Foster Poultry
Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 174, 151 LRRM 2013 (9th Cir. 1995) (employees failing drug test were
reinstated and employer's drug testing program was rescinded pending bargaining with
union despite state regulation mandating random drug testing; court would vacate award
on public policy grounds only if policy "specifically militates against the relief ordered by
the arbitrator").
19
Communications Workers v. SoutheasternElec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467, 132 LRRM 2381 (10th
Cir. 1989) (electric utility lineman in isolated incident sexually harassed customer in her
home); Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 162 LRRM 2641 (10th Cir.
1999) (employee tested positive for marijuana following accident).
20
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots, 808 F.2d 76, 124 LRRM 2300 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(alcoholic airline pilot who had been relicensed by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA)).
21
Compare Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840, 135 LRRM 2659,
54 FEP Cases 24 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922, 136 LRRM 2720, 55 FEP Cases

352 (1991) (male printer sexually harassed female co-workers; reinstatement set aside),
with Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 97 v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1998 WL 253755, 158
LRRM 2198 (2d Cir. 1998) (nuclear plant technician supplied adulterated urine sample
in drug test; reinstatement upheld), and Electrical Workers ([BEW) Local 97 v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 189 F.3d 250, 162 LRRM 2708 (2d Cir. 1999) (nuclear plant safety
officer failed to respond to fire alarm and then lied repeatedly during investigation;
reinstatement upheld). CJ. Halligan v. Piper[affray,lnc., 148 F.3d 197, 77 FEP Cases 182 (2d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034, 79 FEP Cases 512 (1999) (arbitral award rejecting
claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act may be vacated for "manifest
disregard" of law or evidence).
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Third, 22 Eighth, 23 and Eleventh 24 Circuits have vacillated on the
issue, but the most recent decisions seem more in line with Misco.
Because I consider it one of the easier issues in arbitration,
however much misunderstood by a number of courts, I shall deal
brusquely with the rejection of otherwise legitimate awards on the
basis of a nebulous public policy. That usually comes down to the
highly subjective feelings of particular judges. For me, three
estimable critics have correctly assessed the problem and arrived at
the right solution. In various formulations, Judge Frank
Easterbrook25 and Professors Charles Craver26 and David Feller27
have concluded that if the employer (or the employer in conjunction with the union) has the lawful authority to take unilaterally the
action directed by the arbitrator, such as reinstatement of a
wrongdoing employee, the arbitral award should be upheld against
pubic policy claims. If the airline would not have violated the
regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration by putting
the rehabilitated, relicensed alcoholic pilot back in the cockpit,
the arbitrator's award to that effect is valid and enforceable. If the
public utility would not have violated Title VII28 by suspending
rather than firing the sexual harasser because of certain mitigating
circumstances, the arbitrator's award to that effect is valid and
enforceable.

22
Compare U.S. Postal Sero. v. Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 127 LRRM 2593 (3d Cir. 1989)
(postal worker shot at supervisor's car; reinstatement sustained), with Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 143 LRRM 2312 (3d Cir. 1993) (ship helmsman
tested positive for marijuana; reinstatement set aside).
23
Compare lowaElec. Light & Power Co. v. Electrical Workers (!BEW) Local 204, 834 F.2d 1424,
127 LRRM 2049 (8th Cir. 1987) (employee in nuclear power plant defeated safety lock to
take shortcut to lunch; reinstatement vacated), with Homestake Mining Co. of Cal. v.
Steelworkers Local 7044, 153 F.3d 678, 158 LRRM 3101 (8th Cir. 1998) ( mine welder violated
federal safety regulations by not shielding welding operations so as to avoid fire hazard;
reinstatement upheld).
24
Compare U.S. Postal Sero. v. Letter Carriers, 84 7 F.2d 775, 128 LRRM 2842 (11th Cir. 1988)
(postal worker stole from the mails; reinstatement set aside), and Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air
Line Pilots, 861 F.2d 665, 130 LRRM 2014 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871, 132
LRRM 2623 ( 1989) (alcoholic airline pilot who had been relicensed by the FAA; reinstatement overturned), with Florida Power Co. v. Ekctrical Workers (!BEW), 847 F.2d 680, 128
LRRM 2762 (11th Cir. 1988) (employee in possession of cocaine drove while drunk;
reinstatement sustained).
25 E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. GrasselliEmployees Indep. Assoc., 790 F.2d 611,618, 122
LRRM 2217 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Easterbrook, Arbitration,
Contract, and Public Policy, in Arbitration 1991: The Changing Face of Arbitration in Theory
and Practice, Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators,
ed. Gruenberg (BNA Books 1992), 65, 70-77.
26
Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation ofthe Collective Bargaining Process, 66 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 571, 604-05 (1990).
2
7Feller, Court Review of Arbitration, 43 Lab. L.J. 539, 543 (1992).
28
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq. (1994).
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That approach is entirely in keeping with the underlying notion
that the arbitrator is the parties' surrogate, their designated spokesperson in reading and applying the contract. What the parties are
entitled to say or do on their own, the arbitrator is entitled to say
or order. That simple principle seems so self-evident, and so
implicit in the Supreme Court's rulings to date, that it should
become the accepted norm in the future. This would merely
confirm arbitration as the "final and binding" dispute resolution
procedure that the parties' contracts almost invariably denominate it.
We may shortly have further enlightenment from the Supreme
Court on this long-running debate. In March 2000, certiorari was
granted in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers District 17. 29
This was another instance of marijuana ingestion by a worker in a
hazardous occupation, here, a mobile equipment operator. In
sustaining the arbitrator's reinstatement, the district court acknowledged that Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations expressed a "well defined and dominant public policy against
drug use" by "those in safety-sensitive positions." 30 But both the
district court and the court of appeals went on to say, in the latter's
words: "There is no such public policy against the reinstatement of
employees who have used illegal drugs in the past." 31
In short, the key is whether the remedial action ordered by the
arbitrator, not the triggering conduct of the employee, is contrary
to public policy. Of course the drug-taking employee acted contrary
to public policy. But the award-issuing arbitrator did not, and his
decision should stand. Indeed, recognizing the possibility of the
rehabilitation of wrongdoers is a hallmark of a humane and caring
society. 32 Despite the ominous implications of a grant of certiorari
when the court of appeals did not even deign to publish its opinion,
that is the way the Supreme Court should rule in this case.
In addition to refusing to enforce an arbitral award that conflicts
with substantive law or established public policy, courts have

29
120 S. Ct. 1416, 68 USLW 3585 (2000). For the case below, see66 F. Supp. 2d 796, 163
LRRM 2817 (S.D. W. Va. 1998), afj'dpercuriam, 188F.3d 501, 1999WL 635632 (4th Cir.
1999) (unpublished opinion). After this paper was delivered, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine
Workers District 17, 121 S. Ct. 462, 165 LRRM 2865 (2000).
30
66 F. Supp. 2d at 804, 163 LRRM at 2823.
31
1999 WL 635632, at 4.
"'The classic treatment in the penal context is Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative
Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose 80-89 (Yale Univ. Press 1981).
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vacated awards on several other grounds. These have included
arbitrator fraud and corruption, 33 procedural irregularities, 34 lack
of arbitrator jurisdiction or authority, 35 and arbitral "contract
modifications" or "gross error" 36 in interpretation. With the exception of the "modification" or "gross error" grounds, these qualifications comport with the thesis that the arbitrator is the definitive
contract reader. To set aside an arbitral award because of a
jurisdictional or procedural defect is not the same as finding that
the arbitrator misread the contract. Rather, it represents a determination that the premises that make the arbitrator's reading authoritative or reliable are not satisfied. And when a court declines
to enforce an award that violates law or public policy, it does not
question the soundness of the arbitrator's reading of the contract;
it rules that the contract as read is unenforceable.
Much more troublesome is the notion that the arbitrator has
invalidly "modified" or "altered" the contract or has committed
"gross error" in interpreting it. True, many collective bargaining
agreements expressly provide that the arbitrator may not "add to,
modify, or alter" them in any way. Yet, in commissioning the
arbitrator to decide the meaning of their contract, the parties have
commissioned the interpretation of those very terms,
too. If courts are to remain faithful to the teachings of Enterprise

"E.g., Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 139
LRRM 2256 (9th Cir. 1991).
34 E.g., Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 87 LRRM 2337 (D. Conn. 1974), modified
on other grounds, 514 F.2d 285, 88 LRRM 2950 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892, 90 LRRM
2614 (1975). A union's violation of its duty of fair representation in handling an
arbitration case may also negate the finality of the award. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S. 554, 91 LRRM 2481 (1976).
"Electrical Workers (/BEW) Local 728v.jetero Corp., 496 F.2d 661, 88 LRRM 2184 (5th Cir.
1974) (arbitrator could not base award on merit-pay provision when disputes concerning
it were explicitly excluded from arbitration); Electrical Workers (JUE) Local 791 v. Magnavox
Co., 286 F.2d 465, 47 LRRM 2296 (6th Cir. 1961) (arbitrator empowered to decide validity
of employer's increase in assembly-line quotas could not order parties to negotiate for
engineering studies to guide the setting of future quotas).
Positing that an arbitrator had exceeded her remedial authority under a contract
enabled one court to set aside an award reducing three discharges to suspensions. S.D.
Warren Co. v. Paperworkers Local 1069, 845 F.2d 3, 128 LRRM 2175 (1st Cir. 1988). The
arbitrator found that an undercover agent had pressured the employees into handling
drugs on company premises. The court pointed out that the contract gave the employer
the "sole right" to discharge for "proper cause." Wholly ignored was the notion that the
mere listing of drug possession among several specific offenses that could lead to dismissal
did not necessarily eliminate the requirement it had to constitute "proper cause" for
discharge under the facts of a given case. For different views, see F. W Woolworth Co. v.
Miscellaneous Warehousemen's Union, Local 781, 629 F.2d 1204, 104 LRRM 3128 (7th Cir.
1980); Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 109
LRRM 3157 (3d Cir. 1982).
6
' See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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Wheel, they must recognize that most arbitral aberrations are
merely the products of fallible minds, not of overreaching power. 37
There is an inherent tension between the "final and binding"
arbitration clause and the provision barring additions or modifications. Arbitrators cannot function effectively as the parties' surrogates in giving shape and meaning to their necessarily amorphous
contracts unless they are allowed to fill the inevitable lacunae.
Another recognized but anachronistic common-law ground for
setting aside arbitration awards is "gross error." In Electronics Corp.
of America v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, Local 272, 38 an award was vacated because "the central fact
underlying an arbitrator's decision [was] concededly erroneous."
There the arbitrator had assumed, contrary to the evidence as
presented to the court, that an aggrieved employee had not been
suspended previously by the employer. Other courts, however,
have been more diligent in adhering to the Enterprise and Misco
standards rather than common-law precedents. Thus,Judge Richard Posner, speaking for the Seventh Circuit in Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engi,neers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 39 drew
"the line between a gross error by the arbitrator, which a reviewing
court is not authorized to correct, and the arbitrator's exceeding
the scope of his authority by doing something other than contract
interpretation, which the court is authorized to correct.... The test
is not error; it is ultra vires."
For all of that, many courts feel compelled to test an arbitral
award against some minimum standard of rationality. It has been
said that the award must in some "rational way be derived from the
agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any
other indicia of the parties' intention," 40 that the award must not
be a "capricious, unreasonable interpretation," 41 and that it must
be "possible for an honest intellect to interpret the words of the
contract and reach the result the arbitrator reached." 42 The Su7
' See Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 593
(West 1976).
38
492 F.2d 1255, 1256, 85 LRRM 2534 (1st Cir. 1974).
'"768 F.2d 914,922, 120 LRRM 3022 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding arbitrator did not ignore
contract provision but found it superseded by inconsistent provision in parties' second
contract). See also Bieski v. Eastern Auto Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 38, 68 LRRM 2411 (3d
Cir. l968);AlohaMotorslnc. v. Longshoremen (ILWU)Local 142, 530F.2d 848, 91 LRRM 2751
(9th Cir. 1976).
40
LudwigHonoldM/g. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128, 70 LRRM 2368 (3d Cir. 1969).
41
Holly Sugar Co. v. Distillery Workers, 412 F.2d 899, 904, 71 LRRM 2841 (9th Cir. 1969).
42
San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 407 F.2d 1327, 1328, 70
LRRM 3184 (9th Cir. 1969).
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preme Court itself is responsible for some of this ambivalence
about ~nality an~ deference to arbitration. In Enterprise, for example, lt emphasized that the award must "draw its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement" and that the arbitrator must
~o~ "d~spense his own bra':1d of industrial justice. " 43 That is an open
mvitat10n to a court sufficiently unhappy with the result an arbitrator has reached.
One of our most eminent colleagues recently ran afoul of just
such an unhappy court. In Garvey v. Roberts, 44 the Ninth Circuit
vacated an arbitration award rejecting baseball player Steve Garvey's
salary claim based on alleged collusion by the major league clubs.
Earlier, the same arbitrator had chaired the panel that had found
the clubs guilty of colluding to restrain salaries in the free-agent
market. One of the clubs' witnesses in the previous proceeding was
the then president and chief executive officer of the club that had
supposedly offered and then withdrawn a contract extension in
favor of player Garvey. The witness there denied that collusion
affected the Garvey negotiations. In the individual Garvey arbitration, however, that same witness presented a letter recanting his
earlier sworn testimony and asserting his belief that the club had
withdrawn the offer pursuant to the collusion scheme. Nonetheless, Arbitrator Roberts concluded that because of the "shadow"
cast on the credibility of this witness and the lack of corroborating
evidence, he could not find that the club's action was a result of the
collusion rather than a "baseballjudgment founded upon [Garvey's]
age and recent irtjury history." 45
In the eyes of a 2-to-l court majority, this decision "b?rder[e~]
on the irrational" and was an example of an arbitrator impermissibly "dispens[ing] his own brand of industrialjustice.': 46 But ~h~t
should be more sacrosanct than an arbitrator's good-faith credibility determination? And in any event did not the court maj?r_ity fall
in to a logical fallacy in treating Arbitrator Roberts' two decision~ as
irreconcilable? To find that the major league clubs were colludmg
against free agents generally is not to find that the clubs w~re
colluding against them in every single instance. One con~olatio:°
for us in this case is that the majority opinion twice emphasizes this
was a "unique" situation and should not be precedent for more
traditional union-management arbitrations.
43

363 U.S. at 597, 46 LRRM at 2425.
203 F.3d 580, 163 LRRM 2449 (9th Cir. 2000).
/d. at 586, 163 LRRM at 2452.
46
/d. at 590-91, 163 LRRM at 2456.
44

45
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However wrongheaded I may consider the Garvey ruling, the
reality is that there is some line of rationality beyond which courts
will not allow an arbitrator's decision to stray. One could hardly ask
for more from a court than the declaration: "The arbiter was
chosen to be theJudge. ThatJudge has spoken. There it ends. "47 Yet
that same court was prepared to set aside an award "if no judge, or
group ofjudges, could ever conceivably have made such a ruling. " 48
So, too, other courts that proclaim their allegiance to the Enterprise
and Misco principles will balk at enforcing an award that they find
has "no rational basis" because it ignores the "plain meaning" of
the contract. 49 Regrettably, I cannot say that vacating an arbitral
award on grounds of irrationality is contrary to the contract reader
thesis. In the parties' final and binding arbitration agreement, they
presumably took it for granted not only that arbitrators would be
untainted by fraud or corruption, but also that they would not be
insane and their decisions not totally without reason. In any event,
it is probably impossible to keep courts from intervening, on one
theory or another, when an arbitral award is deemed so distorted
as to reflect utter irrationality, if not temporary insanity. One can
only hope that the careful, artful drafting of arbitral opinions will
keep this judicial exception to the finality doctrine to the barest
minimum.
Finally, as is persuasively argued in a forthcoming article by
David Feller, 50 the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 51 may provide the
best solution to the problem ofjudicial review oflabor arbitration
awards. Regardless of the outcome of the current controversy over

47
Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l Union, Local 111, 390 F.2d
79, 84, 67 LRRM 2646 (5th Cir. 1968) (upholding award of additional pay for 24 hours of
unperformed work on the grounds the contract guaranteed 40 hours' pay each week, even
though the employer's payment for 16 hours in one week resulted from a change in
par,days and not any loss in work time).
8
Id. at 82, 67 LRRM at 2648.
49
Compare Wyandot, Inc. v. Food & Co_mmercial Workers Local 227,205 F:3d 922, 163 LRRM
2705 ( 6th Cir. 2000), and Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Newark Typographical Union Local 103,
797 F.2d 162, 167, 123 LRRM 2283 (3d Cir. 1986), with Teamsters Local 957 v. Dayton
Newspapers, Inc., 190 F.3d 434, 162 LRRM 2001 (6th Cir. 1999) (sustaining reinstatement
of carrier dispatcher who grabbed carrier by the neck), and Teamsters Local 115 v. DeSoto,
Inc., 725 F.2d 931, 115 LRRM 2449 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding award that plant closing
violated contract although NLRB had ruled closing was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining).
.
.
'"Feller, Putting Gilmer ¾'here It Belongs: The FAA 's Labor Exemption (unpublished draft on
file with the author). The Supreme Court in Miscoseemed to assume that the FM was not
directly applicable to collective agreements, stating that "federal courts have often looked
to the [FAA] for guidance in labor arbitration cases." 484 U.S. at 40 n.9 (emphasis
suEplied).
19 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (1994).
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the FAA's coverage of an individual worker's hiring arrangements, 52 Professor Feller maintains that collective bargaining agreements are not themselves "contracts of employment," because
typically they only establish rules of employee conduct and do not
create individual hiring agreements. Union-management contracts would therefore not be excluded under section 1 of the FAA,
and the statute's terms should govern. Ifthatviewprevails,judicial
review of labor arbitration awards under collective bargaining
agreements could be sharply limited. Section 10 of the FAA
provides for vacating arbitral awards only in cases of fraud, corruption, or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, or an exceeding
of, or incomplete exercise of, the powers granted the arbitrator.
Nothing is said about an award's "drawing its essence" from the
parties' contract. Review on the merits-even on the grounds of
"irrationality"-is simply not authorized. FAA finality may well be
more final than Enterprise finality.
Contract "Reading" as Contract Interpretation

From what I have said,judges should have an easy time enforcing
most arbitral awards. Instead, they make it hard on themselves. If
they wouldjust take our word for what a contract means, theywould
have far fewer problems. 53 We are the ones with the tough job. How
should arbitrators go about divining the parties' "intent" when the
reality is that they never contemplated the particular issue that has
now arisen? What do we do when the "plain meaning" conflicts with
bargaining history or established practice?
Two splendid articles by our colleagues Carlton Snow and
Richard Mittenthal-do I dare apply that overused term "definitive" to them?-have said nearly all that needs to be said about
plain meaning and past practice. Carlton is, for him, uncharacteristically blunt: "Arbitrators' continued invocation of the plain
meaning rule is anomalous in light of the trend to reject the rule

52The Ninth Circuit has recently held that §§1 and 2 of the FM exclude all workers'
"contracts of employment" from coverage. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 81
FEP Cases 720 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. 2000). Most courts of appeals
are to the contrary, holding that only the contracts of employees in transportation
industries who are "engaged in" commerce are exempt. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177
F.3d 1083, 1086 n.6, 161 LRRM 2403 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999), citing authorities. Compare
Estreicher, Arbitration ofEmpluymentDisputes Without Unions, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 753, 760-62 (1990), withFinkin, Commentary, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 799-803 (1990).
53The courts of course will still have to examine the arbitrator's authority and conduct,
and the award's compliance with law and "well-defined" public policy.
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by the courts, the U.C.C. [Uniform Commercial Code], the Restatement [of Contracts], and treatisewriters."fi 4 Dickwas prepared
to d~dare, ~lmost _40 years ago, that past practice "may be used to
danfy what 1s ambiguous, to give substance to what is general, and
per~,~,ps even to modify or am~nd what is seemingly unambiguous. · · The rest of my remarks will mostly be embroidery upon the
lessons of these masters.
Despite the teachings of Snow and Mittenthal, numerous arbitrators of high repute have accepted or at least paid lip service to
the plain meaning rule and its benighted first cousin, the parol
evidence rule.''fi In most cases this may cause little harm, at least as
to the result. After all, we properly begin our interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement with the language of the contract,
and often we can end there. But one of the great modem state
supreme court justices, Roger Traynor of California, put his finger
on the problem when he said:
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning ofa written
instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to
be clear and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the
intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and
stability our language has not attained. 57

Put differently, if fidelity to the parties' intent (or their putative
intent about a problem that they never anticipated) is the touchstone of sound contract interpretation, the a priori rejection of any

'•'Snow, Contract Interpretation, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 681, 704 (1987). See also Garrett,
Contract Interpretation: I. The Interpretive Process: Myths and Reality, in Arbitration 1985: Law
and Practice, Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators,
ed. Gershenfeld (BNA Books 1986), 121, 125-28.
1•'•Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, in
Arbitration and Public Policy, Proceedings of the 14th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Pollard (BNA Books_l 961), 30-31, reprinted in5? Mic~. L. ~ev. 1017
( 1961). See also Mittentha(, Arbztratwn_Classzcs: II. The Ever-Present Pll!t, m Ar~1trauon 1994:
Controversy and Continmty, Proceedmgs of the 4 7th Annual Meetmg, National Academy
of Arbitrators, ed. Gruenberg (BNA Books 1994), 184; Aaron, The Uses of the Past zn
Arbitration, in Arbitration Today, Proceedings of the 8th Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators, ed. McKelvey (BNA Books 1955), 1.
'• 6 t,·.g., Gibson Refrigerator Co., 17 LA 313,317 (Platt 1951); Thu!lderbirdHotel, 69 LA 10, 13
(Weiss 1977); Merchandise Mart Properties, 105 0 704, 709 (D'.11_1.1el _1995). Underthe pa~ol
evidence rule (a rule of substantive law, not evtdence), a wnung mtended by the parties
as the complete and final integration of their contract may not be contradicted by any prior
agreement or by any contemporaneous _oral agreement. Bu~ there 3:re nu~e~ous qualifications and excepuons. Perhaps mos~ important, rarol evt~ence 1s adm1ss1ble for the
purpose of interpreting the contract itself. 3 Corbm, Corbm on Contracts §§573, 579
(West 1960), 356-70, 412-31.
..
"Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W ThomasDrayage & RzggmgCo., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37,442 P.2d
641 (1968).

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: CONTRACT READING REVISITED

13

evidence reasonably probative of that intent cannot be justified.58
In collective bargaining, what I would call "contextual interpretation" is likely to be grounded in evidence concerning negotiating
history and past practice.
In recent decisions, arbitrators have frequently been prepared
to look behind what might appear to be the plain meaning of the
written instrument to discern intent from bargaining history and
other parol evidence. 59 Of course, arbitrators sometimes play it safe
by finding an ambiguity in the language as written, which makes
their resort to extrinsic evidence quite conventional. But the
arbitrators' ambiguity is often the parties' clear and unambiguous
provision, sustaining the latters' respective opposing positions.
Logically there seems no reason not to take a final step. If the
parties, for reasons sufficient unto themselves-for example, to
conceal trade secrets from the employer's competitors-decided
to cloak certain provisions of the collective agreement in a private
code, an arbitrator should entertain evidence to that effect, however clear and unambiguous the language might otherwise appear.
Professor Corbin is in accord. 60 Needless to say, in any case where
one party alleges and the other denies the use of such a private
code, the arbitrator is going to be skeptical that ordinary English
has been thus stood on its head, and demand pretty convincing
proof of the claim.
That brings us to what I consider the most practical argument in
favor of the plain meaning rule-the time and cost of trying to
prove that what seems on its face clear and unambiguous is not. Yet
here, as in so many other instances, I believe that the solution has
to be the sound discretion of the arbitrator. 61 I would not reject out
58 Cf 5 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §24.9, ed. Perillo (Michie rev. ed. 1998), 59
("Interpretation Requires the Weighing of Evidence, Not Its Exclusion").
59E.g., CBS Inc., 103 LA 596,599 (Christopher 1994); Malta Wood Windows & Doors, 108
LA 1066, 1070-72 (Sharpe 1997); Meadow Gold Dairies, 110 LA865, 870 (Bognanno 1998);
Fors Farms, 112 LA 33 (Cavanaugh 1999); Akzo Mobel Salt, Inc., 113 LA 645, 649-50
(Goldberg 1999). Cf. Union Foundry Co., 113 LA 63 (Baroni 1999). But cf. Mason City
Community Sch. Dist., 109 LA 1125 (Hoh 1997); Baltimore Sun Co., 103 LA 363, 370
(Cushman 1994).
60 See 5 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §24.8, ed. Perillo (Michie rev. ed. 1998), 55 ("Proof
of the use of such a [private] code should determine interpretation even though it was
invented on the spur of the moment for the purposes of just one contract.").
61 Arbitral discretion in discipline and contract interpretation cases has been perceptively explored in Dunsford, ArbitralDiscretion: The Tests ofJust Cause: Part I, in Arbitration
1989: The Arbitrator's Discretion During and After the Hearing, Proceedings of the 42nd
Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Gruenberg (BNA Books 1990), 23;
Mittenthal & Bloch, Arbitral Implications: Hearing the Sounds of Silence: Part I, in Arbitration
1989: The Arbitrator's Discretion During and After the Hearing, Proceedings of the 42nd
Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Gruenberg (BNA Books 1990), 65.
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of hand an offer to prove that the apparently clear and unambiguous was in fact intended to mean something totally different. But
I would refuse proffered evidence that merely reflected one party's
internal, uncommunicated understandings of contract terms, and
I would give short shrift to testimony or exhibits that were vague
and not directly on target. The language finally chosen by the
parties to embody their agreement is entitled to that much re~pect.
Today's major issue concerning past practice is whether 1t can
modify or override clear contractual language to the contrary. M_y
sense is that a long-standing and well-accepted practice may prevail
even over a "clear" and "express" provision in the agreemen!. 62
There is also substantial authority, however, that past practice
cannot trump an unambiguous contract term. 63 Employers have
responded to the encroachments of past practice by seeking
various types of"zipper" clauses, designed to make the final written
agreement the exclusive source of employee rights. Arbitrators are
divided on the efficacy of this approach. 64
Unions undoubtedly invoke past practice more often than
employers in an effort to vary the literal contract language, but that
is by no means universally true. My survey of recent arbitration
decisions on past practice revealed several decisions in which
employers profited from practices contrary to the contract terms. 65
In one rather unusual case, an employee sought the equalization
of overtime on the basis of a contract provision, and the employer
defended by relying on a long-standing practice. The arbitrator

62
£.g., Rexroth Corp., 101 LA 94, 97-98 (Bowers 1993) (40 years without 15 minutes for
lunch); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Mich., 104 LA 705, 708 (Shanker 1995) ("waiver" of
specified times for lunch); Georgi,a-Pacijic Corp., 108 LA 43, 46-47 (Nicholas 1997) (firing
for intoxication without referral to assistance plan); Western Reserve Care Sys., 109 LA 984,
986-87 (Duff 1997) (private duty nurses allowed in operating room). Cf Albertson's, Inc.,
106 LA 897 (Kaufman 1996) (across-the-board pay increases); Ralphs Grocery Co., 112 LA
449 (Gentile 1999) (19-year practice of verbal warning as first disciplinary step; contract
"ambiguous"); T.J Maxx, 113 LA 533 (Richman 1999) (overtime for probationary
emr,Ioyees; ~ontract ~ambiguous").
.
6
E_.g., Natwnal Uniform Sero., 104 ~ 901 (Klem 1995)_ (d~nial of holiday pay); Motor
Appliance Corp., 106 LA 484,487 (Suard11996) (ban on rad10s m plant); Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., 106 LA 535, 541-43 (Howell 1996) (timing of vacation requests); Rice Food Mkts.,
106 LA 726, 731-32 (Marcus 1996) (offense committed one day after "accountability"
period); Robinson J_'ot,:nship Mun. Auth., 109 LA 984, 986-87 (Duff 1997) (switch of
pay<I3;y). Cf ITT Higbie Baylock, 105 LA 1084, 1087 (Florman 1996) (plantwide ban on
smokmg); Earthgrazns Co., 112 LA 170, 173-76 (Grooms 1999) (consecutive vacation
dal,s).
.
.
Compare Village ofBourbannazs, 113 IA 332 (Traynor 1999) (zipper clause prevails) with
Aztertson 's,lnc., 106 LA 897 (Kaufman 1996), and Donaldson Co., 113 LA 723 (Kessler 1999).
See, e.g., Rexroth Corp., supra note 62; Western Reserve Care Sys., supra note 62.
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granted the grievance but, in deference to the past practice, denied
any back pay. 66
All these past practice cases are highly fact-specific. Generalizations are hazardous. But in my view, two fundamental principles
are apposite. First, any contract, including a collective bargaining
agreement, is subject to amendment by the parties to it. Second, for
a practice to become sufficiently well established to be binding on
the parties, it must meet the usual criteria of (1) clarity, (2)
consistency, (3) longevity, and ( 4) mutual acceptability. 67 Mutual
acceptability is especially crucial if the practice is claimed to have
superseded a clear, express contract provision to the contrary. If all
the conditions are properly met, however, the practice should
prevail. The parties are in control of their agreement and, absent
statutory or contractual68 restrictions, they can fashion it or amend
it just as well by deeds as by words. Arbitrators are simply following
the parties' lead in acting accordingly.

"Defensive" Treatment of External Law and Public Policy
Let me append a few words about the treatment of arbitration
cases presenting issues of external law or public policy generally.
Once a great debate raged within the Academy over what an
arbitrator should do when confronted with a conflict between the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the requirements
of external law. 69 I still believe that, theoretically, in the very rare

66

Martin-Marietta Corp., I 03 LA 48 (Girolamo I 994) .
'."1itt~nthal, Past Practice and the Administration of CoUective Bargafning Afs!'eements, in
Arb1trat1on and Public Policy, Proceedings of the 14th Annual Meetmg, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. ~ollard (BNA Books 1961), 32, reprinted in 59 Mich. L. R1;v. 1_017
(1961). Abs_ent an apphca~le zipper clause, other appropriate l~n~age o_f te~mmatl?n,
or substantially changed circumstances, an existing past practice 1s ordmanly earned
forward when a new contract is executed. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv.
L. Rev. 1482, 1499 (1959).
68
~he traditional common law rule is that even by explicit contractual language, the
pan11;s cannot prevent a subsequent modification of the contract by oral or other
unwntten means. 6 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §1295 (West 1962); Farnsworth, Contra~ts §7.6 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2d ed. 1990).
. Compar~ Howlett, The Arbitrator and the NLRB: II. The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Co':rts,
m 1:he Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting,
National Academy of Arbitrators, ed.Jones (BNA Books 1967), 67, 83, 85 (follow the law),
with Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Arbitration, in The Arbitrator, the NLRB,
and the Courts, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Jones (BNA Books 1967), I, 16, 19 (follow the contract). See also Mittenthal,
Meltz~r, Howlett, a!'d St. ~to!ne, The Rnle of Law in Arbitration, in Dev~lopme~ts in
Amencan and F?re1gn Arbitration, Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting, Nauonal
Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Rehmus (BNA Books 1968), 42, 58, 64, 75 (four separate
papers).
67
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case where there is an irreconcilable clash between contract and
law (or "dominant public policy"), and the parties have not
authorized the arbitrator, expressly or impliedly, to take external
law into account, the arbitrator should follow the contract and
ignore the law. That is the parties' commission and the limit of the
arbitrator's authority. 70
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, external law and public policy
are now daily grist for the arbitration mills. This is especially true
of civil rights statutes and the vital protections they provide against
discrimination in employment on the grounds of race, sex, religion, age, disability, and the like. In the collective bargaining
context, arbitrators are constantly applying antidiscrimination
clauses covering such categories. An arbitral award in these situations, where statutory rights are implicated, is of course not entitled
to the same final and binding effect that is customary in pure
contract arbitrations. 71 But under the now-famous footnote 21 in
Gardner-Denver, an arbitration decision in discrimination cases may
be admitted in any subsequent court proceedings, and accorded
"great weight" if certain conditions are met. Those include "procedural fairness," contractual provisions that "conform substantially
with [the applicable statute]," the "special competence of particular arbitrators" and "adequacy of the record." 72
All of us, advocates and arbitrators alike, have a professional
responsibility to ensure compliance with these Supreme Court
standards in mixed contractual-statutory arbitrations. Employers,
unions, and employees should not have to spend time and money
wastefully. To the extent the law allows, arbitral awards ought to
constitute a final disposition of the discrimination claims. In
practice much will depend on the losing party's assessment of its
chances of securing a more favorable result in the courts.
To promote finality, advocates, in preparing their arguments,
and arbitrators, in drafting their decisions, must keep the GardnerDenver factors in mind. I am going to take "procedural fairness" for

"'The Supreme Court seems in accord. An arbitral award is legitimate only ifit "draws
its essence" from the labor agreement, and arbitrators exceed the scope of the submission
if they base their decision on their view of the "requirements of enacted legislation."
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,597, 46 LRRM 2423 (1960).
71
Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 7 FEP Cases 81 (197 4); cf. Wright v. Universal
Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 159 LRRM 2769 (1998).
72415 U.S. at 60 n.21.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: CONTRACT READING REVISITED

17

granted. The others require deliberate attention. The antidiscrimination provisions of the contract may closely track the corresponding statute, but there are now extensive judicial glosses on all
this legislation. The advocates should educate the arbitrator on the
nuances of their particular case. In turn the arbitrators should
demonstrate their awareness of the applicable law and pertinent
court interpretations. That will also serve to establish their "special
competence." This could require more than the two or three pages
often specified for expedited arbitrations. In an important and
complicated case the parties may have to reconsider unrealistic
page limitations. Sticking to rigid rules might ultimately prove, in
terms of both the time and money of a later lawsuit, "penny-wise
and pound-foolish." For their part, arbitrators may have to ask
themselves whether they can in good conscience handle a discrimination case without an opportunity for sufficient legal analysis to
support their conclusions.
The final need is for an "adequate record." I am no fan of costly
verbatim transcripts in a fairly routine arbitration. Even in a
sensitive civil rights case, a comprehensive recital of all the material
testimony and other evidence in the arbitrator's opinion may
suffice. Especially if the facts are complicated or the testimony is
likely to be conflicting, however, the parties and the arbitrator
might be wise to employ a relatively cheap but efficient tape
recorder, or even to arrange for a full-fledged transcript. Thus, in
all the steps of a discrimination case, right through to the writing
of any briefs and the decision, the advocates and the arbitrator
should act "defensively." They ought to envisage a federal judge
looking over their shoulder, scrutinizing their every move and
testing it against the Gardner-Denver criteria. That should be enough
to sharpen up everybody's skill at contract (or statute) reading!
An analogous approach should be followed in the "public
policy" cases. If a sexual harasser or a drug offender in a safetysensitive job is involved, the advocates and in particular the arbitrator ought not turn a blind eye to the policy implications. Judicial
review is a distinct possibility. The arbitrator would enhance the
likelihood of the award' s being sustained by forthrightly confronting the policy issues and explaining convincingly why the result
reached is compatible with the public good. This is a long way from
the almost totally autonomous, private domain oflabor arbitration
we once knew, but I think it accurately reflects the demands of the
new age in which we find ourselves.
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Conclusion
In interpreting and enforcing labor agreements, the roles of
arbitrators and courts are very different. The arbitrator is the
parties' formally designated contract reader. Absent such abnormal circumstances as fraud, corruption, or an exceeding of authority, the arbitrator's award should be accepted by a reviewing co_urt
as if it were the parties' own stipulated and definitive in terpreta~on
of the agreement. The award of course is subject to the same kind
of challenge on the grounds of illegality or violation of public
policy as would have been the contract itself, had it come to court
directly without the intervention of arbitration. But that should
also be the limit of judicial review. If the parties themselves could
lawfully have done what the arbitrator has ordered, the award
should be affirmed and enforced.
In construing and applying the collective agreement, the arbitrator will naturally employ a variety of traditional interpretive tools.
I have focused on two controversial areas. First, I would reject the
broad reach of the plain meaning rule. Regardless of whether
contract language appears clear and unambiguous on its face, I
would admit all credible evidence, within the constraints of procedural feasibility at a hearing, that goes to show the actual intent of
the parties. Second, in spite of seemingly clear, unambiguous
contract terms, I would accept proofs of well-established, mutually
accepted practices that indicate a modification or amendment of
those provisions. In so doing I am most emphatically not trying to
elevate the arbitrator over the parties. My aim is to be faithful to the
parties' manifest intent in the deepest, truest sense.
Finally, as a person who treasures both tradition and autonomy,
I can understand and sympathize with all those who lament the
passing of a time when unions, employers, and arbitrators inhabited a self-made world of labor relations, for the most part untouched by public law and regulation. That day is gone. Yet we
arbitrators have always operated within certain confines, namely,
the parties' own contractual and bargaining frameworks. The
difference is that the parties generally had no resort from our "final
and binding" pronouncements, except to dismiss us from their
panels. Today, a federal judge can bring us up short with a one-line
order.
We can adapt to this new world either grudgingly or gracefully.
My hope is we meet it as a challenge to the best that is within us. I
am confident no member of this Academy lacks the capacity to
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handle most of the applicable statutes and other law and policy.
Take, for example, the concept of "discrimination" under federal
law. It is subtle and elusive. But it is not the Internal Revenue Code.
We have been dealing with "discrimination" under unionemployer contracts for decades. We can deal with it under public
law, too. Thus, we should not flinch from having to change some
of our customary ways. Change, after all, is the law of growth and
survival, and we ignore that truth at our peril.

